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Abstract
In the model a …scal stabilisation is announced under asymmetry of infor-
mation between the government and the private investors. The government
could be of two types: a dry type and a wet type, according to the amount of
spending cuts it decides to make. Private investors may thus lack con…dence
in the stabilisation program and interest rates would be too high, re‡ecting
this lack of credibility. A dry type which has to …nance new spending may
want to signal its resolution (type) in order to lower its interest costs and one
way to do that would be to repurchase a fraction of the outstanding debt. The
wet type could also decide to buyback some of its debt in order to pretend
to be a dry type and to (possibly) lower its interest payments. It is showed
that a critical amount of buyback exists such that the two types could be
separated.
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1. Introduction
From 1990 onwards, some OECD countries have begun to acquire experience in
the use of debt repurchase instruments and some of them have established regular
bond repurchasing programmes (from Tables 1 to Table 4, in the Appendix, more
detailed information is presented). As far as we know, the literature on public debt
management has not dealt with buybacks of public (domestic) debt, while they have
been analysed quite deeply in the international debt framework.
Missale (1999) points out how policy-makers’ approach to debt management
implies a trade-o¤ between cost and risk minimisation. A strategy of cost minimi-
sation would suggest issuing securities with the lowest risk premium (which would
then pay high returns when labour and capital income are lower than expected),
while, to minimise risk, the correlation between debt returns and income should
be positive. Missale argues that policy-makers have so far been mainly concerned
with the minimisation of borrowing costs (“without taking too much risk”) while,
according to him, the correct approach should be the opposite, provided that risk
premia on government securities are “fair”, that is they re‡ect only their risk-return
characteristics. In sum, the objective of reducing interest costs should be pursued
only when interest rates on debt are “unfair”, i.e. they incorporate a risk premium
which may result from market imperfections and from the government’s credibility
problems.
The main idea of this paper is that buybacks could be used to eliminate unfair
risk premium since they can help resolve a government’s credibility problems. (Debt
repurchases could actually be used also to reduce market imperfections as they might
help improving liquidity and e¢ciency in the secondary market.)
More speci…cally, a theoretical model is developed to examine whether buy-
backs of public debt may signal a government type. In the model it is assumed that
the government could be of two types: a dry type and a wet type, according to their
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willingness to implement a …scal stabilisation (in this model this basically means
reducing …scal spending). Asymmetry of information between the government and
private investors is assumed. In particular interest rates are assumed to incorpo-
rate a risk premium which re‡ect the expectation that the inability to implement
a stabilisation programme may result in more in‡ation and/or taxation, or debt
default.
In particular, during a …scal stabilisation, private investors would lack con…-
dence in the stabilisation programme and interest rates would be too high, re‡ecting
this lack of credibility. (This argument is to some extent similar to Missale et al.,
1997). Thus, a dry type which has to …nance new spending may want to signal its
resolution in order to lower its interest costs and one way to do that would be to
repurchase a fraction of the outstanding debt. The wet type could also decide to
buy-back some of its debt in order to pretend to be dry and to (possibly) lower its
interest payments. It is showed that a critical amount of buyback exists such that
the two types could be separated.
In Section 4 we examine the series of prices of long term Italian bonds in order
to test the main implication of the theoretical model and the results seem consistent
with the theory.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we brie‡y review the
literature. In Section 3 the theoretical model is presented and Section 4 contains
some empirical evidence about the repurchases of public debt and the results of the
structural break test which was carried out in order to test for the implications of
the theoretical model. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. Related Literature
One of the most debated aspects of voluntary international debt reduction has been
whether debtor countries bene…t from repurchases of their outstanding debt on the
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secondary market, at low prices. Many countries have been keen to do so, as they
considered the reduction in the price of their liabilities an attractive opportunity. In
principle, contracts between a debtor and its creditors forbid debtor governments to
engage in these market buybacks without receiving special permission (Rotemberg,
1991), but in practise these transactions have been common.1
Bulow and Rogo¤ (1988, 1991) provide a formal statement of the critique to
buybacks. They argue that buybacks, even at existing secondary prices (“average
value,” as in their paper) are a costly mistake for the debtor, and that the country
should be prepared to pay no more than the “marginal” value of its debt, which the
authors argue is much lower.2 Other authors, instead, see buybacks with favour:
a di¤erent set of motives for buybacks is given, among the others, by Krugman
(1989), Froot (1989), Rotemberg (1991), Acharya and Diwan (1993), Cohen and
Verdier (1995), Thomas (1996), Marchesi and Thomas (1999).
In public (domestic) debt management, buybacks could be used both to elimi-
nate “unfair” risk premium, that is only due to asymmetry of information between
the government and the private sector and to reduce market imperfections as they
can help improving liquidity and e¢ciency in the secondary market. As Missale
(1999) points out how policy-makers approach to debt management implies a trade-
o¤ between cost and risk minimisation, he argues that policy-makers have so far
been mainly concerned with the minimisation of borrowing costs (“without tak-
ing too much risk”) while the correct approach should be the opposite, provided
that risk premia on government securities are “fair”, that is they re‡ect only their
risk-return characteristics. In sum, the objective of reducing interest costs should
1For example, Brazilian state …rms eliminated nearly $7 billion of external debt in 1988 alone
through discounted buybacks. Bolivia, in 1988, o¤ered an example of a buyback of commercial
bank debt at the secondary market prices (it took four years to complete). More recently also
Niger bought back all of its commercial bank debt and Chile used the secondary market to reduce
its debt through buybacks, too.
2Since the marginal value is de…ned as the probability of repayment while the average value is
given by the ratio of the total market value of the country’s debt (which includes what creditors
receive when the country pays back only in part) over the outstanding debt, the average value is
bigger than the marginal value.
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be pursued only when interest rates on debt are “unfair”, that is they incorporate
a risk premium which may result from market imperfections and a government’s
credibility problems.3
2.1. Market Imperfections
As far as market imperfections are concerned, interest costs should be reduced by
enhancing the transparency and predictability of the issuing policy, by increasing the
liquidity and e¢ciency of secondary markets (which would lead to thick markets and
to a greater “standardisation” of the securities that are o¤ered) and by introducing
borrowing and risk-hedging facilities (futures and option contracts in government
bonds have been introduced in most countries so as to provide hedges against the
interest rate risk of securities holdings).4 “A regular issuing policy which relies on the
same set of instruments, irrespective of market conditions, and increases the issue
size of government securities, allows saving on risk premia which would otherwise be
required for the uncertainty of sales and for the illiquidity of government.” (Missale,
1999).
In this contest, debt buybacks have been used to improve the liquidity and the
e¢ciency in the secondary market. Among the most frequent objectives of the repur-
chases there have actually been: smoothing of the maturity pro…le (some countries
used an early redemption programme to eliminate heavy infra-year concentration
of debt redemption; this permitted better management of cash ‡ow demand and
reduced the interest rate impact on the burden of the public debt); the reduction
of debt servicing costs (after misalignements along the yield curve are identi…ed,
securities with yields not in line with the benchmark curve are repurchased) and
3More precisely, di¤erences in the expected returns of debt instruments are “fair” if they re‡ect
properly called risk premia, asked by risk-averse investors who do not make systematic mistakes,
are fully informed about the likelihood of future events, and con…dent that …scal and monetary
policy actions will be carried out as announced.
4More recently, “repurchase agreement” (repos) markets have been established in many coun-
tries allowing dealers to cover open positions which they have to take in the process of market
making (Missale, 1999).
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elimination of securities with poor liquidity (to maintain high liquidity in the sec-
ondary market, some countries decided either to repurchase small amounts of illiquid
bonds and eliminated them or to switch from illiquid to liquid ones). In the long
run, all of these choices lead to a reduction of the cost of …nancing. A market with
a smoother redemption pro…le, more liquid instruments and an informative yield
curve provide a government with lower cost and better opportunities to fund its
debt. Table 2, in the Appendix contains the analytic answers of the interviewed
countries.
2.2. Asymmetric information
According to Missale (1999), the other circumstance in which an objective of inter-
est cost minimisation should prevail over the budgetary risk minimisation (namely
discretion in public debt management should be used) is when interest rates incor-
porate a risk premium which derives from credibility problems. In this paper we
focus on the credibility problems that might derive from the uncertainty about a
government’s announcement because of the asymmetry of information between the
government and the private sector.
More speci…cally, private investors may not be able to tell how serious the
government really is about the reform process. Imperfect information of this sort
is likely to be particularly present in developing countries or in countries where
governments rotate quite frequently (as in Italy). The resolution of this kind of
credibility problem will require the government to signal its true type (Rodrik, 1989).
In assessing the e¤ect of observed policy choices on credibility the role of exter-
nal circumstances may be especially important when policies have persistent e¤ect
on the economic environment. As in Drazen and Masson (1994): “if tough policies
constrain the room to maneuver in the future then following a tough policy may
actually harm rather than enhance credibility.” They actually present a model in
which a policymaker maintains a …xed parity in good times but devalues in if the
6
unemployment rate gets too high. The idea is that, in case of persistence of unem-
ployment, oberving a tough policy in a given period may actually lower rather than
raise the credibility of a no-devaluation in subsequent periods.
Extending Drazen and Masson, Benigno and Missale (1997) examines how pub-
lic debt, policy-makers’ credibility and external circumstances a¤ect the probability
of exchange rate devaluation. Public debt creates the link between current and fu-
ture policy actions. In fact, if the debt level is low (or in absence of it) there is a
strong incentive to resist the temptation of a devaluation and its only e¤ect would
be to reveal a weak government, thus increasing the likelihood of future devaluations
(the so called “signalling e¤ect” dominates). On the contrary, if the level of debt
is high, a devaluation would reduce the debt burden and thus the need to resort to
further ones in the future (the so called “debt burden e¤ect” prevails).5
There is another paper that actually links the timing of an intervention by
policy-makers (in this case a …scal corrections) to the level of public debt (Drudi and
Prati, 1998). In their framework, a …scal stabilisation can be delayed if debt levels
(and risk premia) are below a certain level so that no government has the incentive
to tighten …scal policy and to run a surplus (i.e., pooling equilibria prevail). Only
if risk premia or debt levels are beyond a critical threshold, do interest payments
become so large that good type (dry) government prefer to run primary surpluses,
thus signalling the sustainability of the …scal regime. That is separating equilibria
do exist where good type government achieve primary surplus and bad type ones
default.
Finally, Missale et al. (1997) provides theory and evidence on the behaviour of
public debt managers at the start of …scal stabilisations. In such episodes interest
rates on long-term debt could be high because of lack of con…dence in the stabil-
5Debt accumulation is actually shown to reduce the credibility of an exchange rate regime but
only in the short run as there are no e¤ects on the credibility in the long-run. Reputational
incentives reduce the short term interest rates but there is no impact on the forward rate since it
depends only on fundamentals.
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isation programme by private investors. In this case the informational advantage
of the authorities makes it possible to minimise the cost of debt service by issuing
short maturity debt.
The evidence shows that governments, at the start of a stabilisation, tend to
issue a larger share of short maturity debt the less credible is the programme and
the lower is the roll-over risk. The theoretical model demonstrates that the debt
issuing strategy which is observed in reality can be consistent with optimal debt
management assuming asymmetry of information between the government and pri-
vate agents.
In a similar context we will show how a debt repurchase could help to reduce
an “unfair” risk premium, that is only due to asymmetry of information between
the government and the private sector.
3. The model
To introduce the concept of a buyback in a public debt framework we start with
a very simple model. The model extends over two periods, period zero and period
one. We assume that, at t = 0, the government has inherited an amount D of public
debt at the …xed gross 2-period interest rate i; so Di is due at t = 1 (where D is
normalised to one). Thus, interest rate repayments on the outstanding debt are set
before the “game” starts.
We also assume that the government could be of two types: a dry type and a wet
type, according to the amount of spending cuts it decides to make. A dry government
carries out larger cuts and has a level of spending GL (at the end of period zero)
which is lower than the level of spending GH of a wet government. However, the
two levels of spending GL and GH will not actually enter the analysis, except as
signals that invariably identify the two types i: The fundamental characteristic that
di¤erentiates the two types is a risk premium on period one interest payments p,
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which can either be pW or pD, depending whether it corresponds to the wet or the
dry type risk premium, respectively.
Asymmetry of information is assumed: the amount of spending cuts made by
the government (and thus the level of spending) is not known ex ante to private
investors and it will be observed only at the end of period zero. Private investors
are assumed to be risk neutral.
If some new borrowing takes place at the beginning of period zero, to be rolled
over in period one, the costs of that borrowing will depend on the interest rates
both in period zero and in period one. In particular, at t= 1, interest rates will be
determined after the uncertainty about the government’s type is resolved. Interest
costs will be lower if the level of spending is low, or higher if spending is high. More
speci…cally, in both periods interest rates contain a risk premium which re‡ects the
expectations that the inability to stabilise the economy may result in debt default (or
higher in‡ation and/or taxation) and which is greater for the wet type government.
In this Section we are going to assume that both risk premia are exogenous; in
the next Section the risk premium in period one will be endogenous.
After the dry government, at t = 0, implements a stabilisation programme
(which here basically consists in cutting public spending), which is going to a¤ect
the level of spending (and thus the interest rate in period one), she might …nd it
bene…cial to buy-back a fraction of her outstanding debt, issuing at the same time
short-term debt to be rolled over at the beginning of period one. In this way she
could bene…t from a “reputation e¤ect” of her policy in terms of reduced interest rate
in both periods. In period one, because after public spending is actually observed,
the government type is distinguished and the risk premium on interest payments can
decrease (if the type is dry). In period zero, however, because the buyback could
be the signal that a government is dry (assuming only the dry type can actually
bene…t from reduced rates in period one, if there is a separating equilibrium), it
could in‡uence the risk premium of period zero, as well. Timing is described in
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Figure 3.1:
Figure 4.1
Issuing short term debt and rolling it over is preferred here by the dry type (to
issuing 2-period debt) because, in this way, she can bene…ts from the consequences
of her implementation of the stabilisation programme, in terms of reduced interest
costs. Missale et. al (1997) also develop a model in which short-term debt maturity
is actually used as a signalling device by the government which is really committed
to carrying out the …scal stabilisation.
We examine …rst the very simple model, with neither additional …nancing nor
period zero risk. We will see that without assuming both some new borrowing and
some default risk in period zero as well as in period one, the buyback leaves the
dry type indi¤erent and the wet type worse o¤. So while it separates the two types,
there is no advantage to the authority in undertaking the buyback.
We start by making the following assumptions: (A1) There are no resources
for repaying at the end of period zero, therefore all debt has to be carried forward
to the end of period one; (A2) There is no additional spending, nor stabilisation
risk during period zero. (Assumptions one and two make sense if the period zero
is “very short term.”) (A3) Information of wet/dry is revealed before debt can be
rolled over.
Let’s de…ne i* as the gross safe (world) interest rate (= 1 + r), where i* is
assumed constant over the two periods. Suppose there is a separating equilibrium
in which the (critical) size of the repurchase of debt at the outset of period zero
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signals the type, then the following “arbitrage” condition should hold:
i(1¡ p) = qi0(1¡ p)i1; (3.1)
where p can either be pW or pD (see above). Notice that we allow the wet type
to repurchase some debt, i.e. we consider a separating equilibrium in which the
wet type does a positive repurchase, but at a di¤erent level. Q is the price of the
repurchase of one unit (£1 face value) of the inherited debt; i1 is the interest rate
in period one and can take the two values iW1 or i
D
1 and i0, which is the interest rate
in period one, is equal to i* (there is no risk in period zero). The left hand side of
(3.1) represents the expected returns to a bondholder from one unit of inherited debt
over the two periods, while the right hand side contains the returns from selling one
unit of debt at the start of period zero at the price q; earning i0 in period zero and
(1¡ p)i1, in period one. Notice that the probability of default, in period one, is the
same either holding long-term or short-term debt. Below, we take into account the
possibility that holding short term debt can introduce some default probability in
period zero as well, that’s being more consistent with the literature on debt default
according to which shortening the maturity of government’s debt can increase the
possibility of a crisis equilibrium (see for example, Alesina et al., 1990).
The arbitrage condition in period one is:
i* = (1¡ p)i1; (3.2)
and substituting (3.2) in (3.1), the price of one unit of debt becomes:
q =
i(1¡ p)
(i*)2
:
If the wet type does the repurchase, he will be believed to be dry and therefore the
price per unit of debt repurchased will be:
qD =
i(1¡ pD)
(i*)2
;
rather than:
qW =
i(1¡ pW )
(i*)2
;
11
where qD is higher than qW as the dry type is safer. Correspondingly, the interest
rate the wet type has to pay in period 1 is greater since it is a riskier type. That is:
iW1 =
i*
(1¡ pW );
while
iD1 =
i
(1¡ pD) :
We assume that the government is interested only in minimise the amount it has
to repay at the end of period one, assuming it does not default. Thus, the cost
of the repurchase of one unit of debt, at the end of t = 1; for the wet government
(assuming it does not default) is:
C = qDi0i
W
1 ;
that is:
C =
i(1¡ pD)
(i*)2
i*
i*
(1 ¡ pW) = i
(1 ¡ pD)
(1¡ pW ) > i: (3.3)
As we can see, for the wet type, the buyback (no matter what its size) is bad if
it signals the dry type, since his interest costs are higher than in the case without
it, while the dry type has the same interest payment and so she will be indi¤erent.
Likewise, the wet type is indi¤erent about doing a buyback if this signals it is wet,
and in this case the dry type would strictly prefer to mimic the wet type (just
replace pW by pD in (3.3) and you would get a fraction that is smaller than i) so
there cannot be a separating equilibrium in which the wet type makes a positive
repurchase. More speci…cally, if there was a separating equilibrium, it would be of
the form: if any repurchase is made, then the probability of the dry type would be
one. There cannot be a positive threshold value for the buyback, since the dry type
would like to undertake a smaller buyback to signal it is wet. In this model there is
no reason to have a buyback as this does not a¤ect the ultimate allocation in terms
of interests payments made by either type.
This conclusion will not change if we modify assumption (A2) introducing some
risk in period zero as well. (Notice that period zero risk does not a¤ect the risk on
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long-term debt). Condition (3.1) becomes:
i(1¡ p) = qi0(1¡ s)i1(1 ¡ p) (3.4)
where i0 can either be iW0 or iD0 : Let’s assume that the wet type has a period zero
default risk equal s; so i*= (1 ¡ s)iW0 and the cost of one unit repurchase for the
wet type is:
C = qDiD0 i
W
1
which is the same as before (see (3.3)). Again, interest costs are not diminished and
so there is no reason to have a buyback.
In this model, in addition to period 0 risk, some new borrowing F , to be …nanced
at the beginning of period zero, can make the repurchase worthwhile. The dry type
will gain for sure from the buyback because she is normally indi¤erent about that,
but assuming additional spending to be …nanced in period zero and a small risk
premium that could be reduced by the repurchase, it will be surely better o¤. (Note
that, without any uncertainty, interest costs with and without buybacks would be
the same, that is (3.5) and (3.6) are the same when s = 0: Thus, as above, there
would be no reason to have a buyback).
The reason why she did not bene…t from the reduced risk premium obtained
by signalling its type before was that the current holders of debt simply valued
their debt more highly once they believed they were facing the dry type, and so the
buyback took place at a high price which just re‡ected this reduced risk.
The wet type is normally worse o¤ with the buyback, since this takes place at
a high price, corresponding to the dry type’s risk premium. But with the …nancing
of new expenditure, he could …nd it advantageous to pretend to be dry in order
to bene…t from better conditions on the new borrowing. We argue there will be a
critical amount of the repurchase such that the two types will be separated.
Let’s de…ne b as the amount of debt which is repurchased by the dry type at
t = 0. Then, at time zero, the dry type should decide whether to do the buyback or
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not. Thus, she should compare the interest costs of the outstanding debt and of the
new borrowing in the two circumstances of with and without buyback. If she opts
for the buyback strategy, the timing of the model will be the following: at t = 0 the
government repurchases an amount b of its outstanding debt, to be rolled over in
period one, and simultaneously …nances the new borrowing with short term debt, to
be rolled over at the beginning of period one as well. At the end of period zero, the
level of public spending G is observed and the risk premium of period one interest
rate is determined.
Therefore, assuming again a separating equilibrium and that there is some
default risk in period zero as well as in period one (as above), if the dry government
does the buyback, her interest costs would be:
RDb = bq
DiD0 i
D
1 + (1 ¡ b)i + FiD0 iD1 (3.5)
= i + F
(i*)2
(1¡ pD) ;
while, without any buyback, they would be:
RD = i + FiW0 i
D
1 = i+ F
(i*)2
(1¡ s)(1¡ pD) (3.6)
where, although after observing no buyback beliefs put probability one on the wet
type, this reverts to probability one on the dry type once spending is observed. As
we can see, RDb < R
D and the repurchase is always advantageous.
On the other hand, the wet type’s interest costs with the buyback are:
RWb = bq
DiD0 i
W
1 + (1 ¡ b)i + FiD0 iW1 (3.7)
= bi
(1¡ pD)
(1 ¡ pW) + (1 ¡ b)i + F
(i*)2
1¡ pW
and, without it, they are:
RW = i + FiW0 i
W
1 (3.8)
= i + F
i*
(1¡ s)
i*
(1¡ pW )
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In order to obtain the critical value of b such that the two types are separated, we
need to …nd that b (= bS) such that the interest costs the wet type has to pay with
the repurchase (RWb ) are equal to the interest costs it should pay without it (RW):
then any b > bS will be separating. That is:
bSi
(1¡ pD)
(1¡ pW ) + (1¡ b
S)i +F
(i*)2
(1 ¡ pW ) = i +F
(i*)2
(1 ¡ s)(1¡ pW ) (3.9)
which reduces to:
bS = F
(i*)2
(pW ¡ pD)i
s
(1 ¡ s) (3.10)
where bS is increasing in the quantity of new borrowing F and in the risk premium
s (these two factors make the buyback more advantageous for both types) and
decreasing in the di¤erence between pW and pD and in i (both of them increase the
costs of doing the repurchase). If this di¤erence tends to zero (i.e., pW = pD) bS
tends to in…nity as good type bonds tend to cost the same as bad type ones (i.e.,
they become cheaper). On the other hand, if s = 0; bS = 0; as the advantage of
carrying out a repurchase vanishes. The reason why the separating equilibrium can
actually work is that the dry type is more willing to convert its debt to short term
debt because she is not afraid of adverse information becoming available during the
course of longer maturities, whereas the wet type would have to roll over at a higher
interest rate (at the end of period zero).
As for the dry type interest rates, we need to check whether its interest costs
in the buyback case are always lower than the ones it pays with no buyback. The
dry type might …nd it more advantageous to repurchase only a fraction b < bS (I
am assuming here that beliefs are such that Prob[W j b < bS = 1]) in order to pay
a lower buyback price in period zero and still be able to reduce her interest costs
in period one, after the asymmetry of information is cleared. Obviously, bS will be
preferable if the corresponding interest payments RDb are lower. Let’s de…ne R
D
b
as
the interest costs that correspond to b :
RD
b
= bqWiW0 i
D
1 + (1¡ b)i+ FiW0 iD1 (3.11)
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= b
i(1¡ pW )
(i*)2
i*
(1 ¡ s)
i*
(1 ¡ pD) + (1¡ b)i +F
i*
(1 ¡ s)
i*
(1¡ pD)
= b
i
(1¡ s)
(1¡ pW )
(1¡ pD) + (1¡ b)i +F
(i*)2
(1 ¡ pD)(1¡ s)
RD
b
>RDbS if:
b
i
(1¡ s)
(1¡ pW )
(1¡ pD) + (1 ¡ b)i + F
(i*)2
(1¡ pD)(1 ¡ s) > i + F
(i*)2
(1¡ pD) (3.12)
that simpli…es to:
bi
·
(1 ¡ pW)
(1 ¡ s)(1¡ pD) ¡ 1
¸
> ¡ F (i*)
2s
(1 ¡ pD)(1¡ s)
that means:
b · F (i*)
2s
(1 ¡ pD)(1¡ s)i
µ
(1 ¡ pD)(1¡ s)
(1¡ pD)(1¡ s)¡ (1 ¡ pW)
¶
(3.13)
=
F (i*)2s
[(1¡ pD)(1 ¡ s) ¡ (1¡ pW )]i
under the assumption that (1¡ pD)(1¡ s) > (1¡ pW) (for instance when (1¡ s) is
very close to one).
Thus, if s is low, if the dry type does the buyback she basically bene…ts by
borrowing F at the true (low) risk premium. If she does not undertake a buyback
she has to borrow F at the wet risk premium in period zero, which is obviously
worse. The issue is what happens if she was to buy-back b, 0 < b < bS? If we
assume that any for any b < bS; the government is assumed to be wet, then he
bene…ts by the fact that the buyback price re‡ects the risk premium for the wet
government over the two periods. Clearly the larger b is the more tempting this
is (and if s is lower, b does not have to be so big for the temptation to succeed).
(3.13) says just this: if b · RHS(3:13) then it does not pay to pretend to be wet,
while it does if b > RHS(3:13): But since it is easily checked that RHS(3:13) > bS
(and b cannot obviously be bigger than bS) then for the dry type it never pays to
be believed wet.
In sum, if bS is the critical value for beliefs, then the separating equilibrium
works (assuming (1¡ pD)(1 ¡ s) > (1¡ pW ), and indeed any value eb in between bS
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and (3.13) works (i.e. if beliefs are: Prob:[dry] = 1 if b > bS and zero otherwise).
But if eb was above this range, then it is not a separating equilibrium as dry type
would do a lower buyback.
3.1. Endogenous risk premium
We now assume that the government wants to minimise the following loss function:6
L =
1
2
T 2 + pK
in which T is the level of taxes, K is the …xed cost of failure relative to the cost of
tax distortions and p is the probability that the stabilisation fails. The loss function
has been used by Dornbush (1991) and Drazen and Masson (1994) in the context
of exchange rate stabilisation. The cost of taxation is standard, while the cost of a
failed stabilisation re‡ects either the reputational and political costs of missing the
announced budget target, as in Dornbush, or the higher in‡ation which may result
if the stabilsation fails, as in Drazen and Masson.
The level of taxes T is set at the beginning of period one (once the period one
interest rate has been determined) and, after that, the only remaining source of
uncertainty arises from an exogenous shock X, which hits the government budget
at the end of period one. As we said in the previous Section we now assume that
p, and T are endogenous. Raising taxes is costly, because they are distortionary.
Their level is chosen so to minimise the loss function where:
L =
1
2
T 2 if stabilisation succeeds
L =
1
2
T 2 +K if stabilisation fails
The probability that the stabilisation fails, i.e., that debt D increases (¢D = X +
G+R ¡ T > 0) is the probability that an adverse shock to the budget exceeds the
planned surplus:
p = Prob[X > T ¡G¡R]
6The same loss function is used, for example, in Dornbusch (1991) and in Missale et al. (1997).
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Figure 3.2:
where, as we saw above, R could take four di¤erent values (from 3.5) to (3.8) and
shock X has a triangular distribution with mean zero and a support ranging between
¡a and a.
At t = 0 there is still uncertainty about the government type and the buyback
of public debt could be the signal that a government is dry (as above) and so private
investors will apply the dry type risk premium pDb to short term rates. In period
one, after the uncertainty about the government’s type is resolved and assuming no
buyback, the risk premium will be determined according to the level of spending
which has been observed: it will be pD if the level of spending has been low, or pW
if spending has been high. Notice that there is a slight change of notation respect
to the previous Section as pDb and p
D are not equal anymore. As for the wet type
pWb now represents the risk premium that applies o¤ the equilibrium actions (that is
when the wet type tries to cheat) and pW indicates the risk premium corresponding
to the wet type when no buyback is made.
Consider the choice of taxes and debt maturity by a government whose pro-
gramme is expected to succeed (likely stabiliser) in the sense that forX = E0(X) = 0
(and for its choice of taxes T*) the overall budget shows a surplus: ¯ = T*
¡GL ¡ I > 0 and it could fail only if hit by a very large realisation of X:7 We
actually limit our analysis to the case in which both governments are on average
successful but the size of the shock which could cause them to fail, ¯W and ¯D di¤er
as they di¤er only in their spending G. Timing is now described in Figure 4.2.
7The support of the distribution of i must also be bounded from above to rule out the possibility
that the surplus turns out to be negative because of a large realisation of i:
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Since the planned surplus ¯ is positive, the probability of failure is lower than
1/2 and it is derived using the right hand side of the triangular distribution of X,
that is:
p = Prob[X > T ¡G¡R] = 1
2a2
(a + G+ R ¡ T)2
Replacing p in the government function yields the loss that the government expects
before knowing the realisation of X, but after having observed the period one interest
rate, and thus R:
L =
K
2a2
(a +G+ R¡ T )2 + 1
2
T 2
Di¤erentiating L with respect to T we obtain the value of taxes:
T* = ±(a+ G+ R) where 0 < ± ´ K
a2 +K
< 1
which is increasing in public spending and thus in the cost of debt service.
Substituting T * back into p we obtain:
p = °(a+ G+ R)2 where 0 < ° ´ a
2
2(a2 +K)2
< 1
where p now could take four di¤erent values depending on:
pDb = °(a + G
L +RDb )
2 = °
·
a + GL + i + F
(i*)2
(1¡ pDb )
¸2
(3.14)
pD = °(a +GL+ RD)2 = °
·
a +GL + i + F
(i*)2
(1¡ s)(1 ¡ pD)
¸2
(3.15)
pW = °(a +GH + RW )2 = °
·
a + GH + i +F
(i*)2
(1 ¡ s)(1¡ pW )
¸2
(3.16)
and:
pWb = °(a + G
H + RWb )
2 = °
·
a + GH + bi
(1¡ pDb )
(1 ¡ pWb )
+ (1 ¡ b)i + F (i*)
2
(1¡ pWb )
¸2
(3.17)
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Substituting T* in the loss function, yields the value of the loss function L*, as of
the beginning of period zero:
L* =
1
2
T 2 + pK
=
1
2
±2(a+ G+ R)2 + °(a + G+R)2K
which simpli…es to:
L* =
±
2
(a +G+ R)2
The wet type will now reveal itself if the losses, when he chooses not to do the
buyback and he is identi…ed as being wet, are smaller than the losses when he
chooses to do the buyback and he is believed to be dry. That is:
LW [W; b = 0] · LW £D; b ¸ bS¤
which means:
±
2
£
a +GH + RW
¤2
<
±
2
[a +GH + RWb ]
2 (3.18)
that is:
±
2
·
a +GH + bi
(1¡ pDb )
(1 ¡ pWb )
+ (1 ¡ b)i + F (i*)
2
1¡ pWb
¸2
¡±
2
·
a + GH + i + F
(i*)2
(1¡ s)(1 ¡ pW)
¸2
¸ 0
(3.19)
(3.19) as an equality is the equation of a parabola with two roots:
b1 =
F i2(pW (¡1 + pWb ) ¡ pWb + s)
(pWb ¡ pDb )(1¡ s)i
b2 =
1
(pDb ¡ pWb )(¡1 + s)i
(¡2F (i*)2 + F (i*)2pWb +F (i*)2pW ¡ F (i*)2pWb pW + F (i*)2s+
2a(¡1 + pW + s¡ pWs) + 2GH(¡1 + pW + s¡ pWs) ¡ 2i +2pW i +2si¡ 2pWsi)
where b2 simpli…es to:
b2 =
¡[Fi2(1¡ s+ (1¡ pWb )(1¡ pW )) + 2(a + GH + i)(1 ¡ s)(1¡ pW )]
(pWb ¡ pDb )(1¡ s)i
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which is always negative. Thus, the extra-losses from being believed dry are positive
only for b > b1. That implies that the separating condition (3.18) is satis…ed for:
b ¸ bS ´ b1 = F (i*)
2(pW (¡1 + pWb ) ¡ pWb + s)
(pWb ¡ pDb )(1 ¡ s)i
(3.20)
We can see that the candidate separating amount of buyback bS is positive only if:
s > pWb + p
W ¡ pWpWb
and it is increasing in F and in s and decreasing in i (as we saw above, in (3.10)).
If bS is negative, then any positive critical value for beliefs will work (thinking of bS
as being the minimum value for the critical belief).
Finally, after substituting (3.16), (3.17) and (3.14) (whose value was for sim-
plicity put equal to zero) into (3.20) and with the help of numerical simulations,
we have found positive values of b and pWb and p
W and lying between zero and one
(Table 4.1).
Table 4.1: Some simulation results
i 1.0518 1.0518 1.0518 1.1000 1.1500
i* 1.0480 1.0480 1.0480 1.0500 1.0700
a 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
K 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
° 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
GH 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
F 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
pDb 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
s 0.0025 0.0050 0.0100 0.0050 0.0050
bS 0.00973 0.22912 0.67075 0.19478 0.16835
pWb 0.001195177738 0.00119560062 0.00119645301 0.00127117554 0.001358241842
pW 0.001195177739 0.00119560063 0.00119645302 0.00127117557 0.001358241847
Note that i is the gross 2-period return and its value is set equal to the Euro-11
two years gov. bond (as in the Economist of the 9th September); i* is the gross
safe world interest rate and its value is set equal to the average of 3-months money
market of 8 OECD countries (i.e., Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Japan,
Sweden, Switzerland, United States, as in the Economist of the 9th September);
° ´ a2
2(a2+K)2
:
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From the …rst three columns of Table 4.1 we can observe that as s increases
(ceteris paribus), bS increases as well. That is because buybacks become more
advantageous for both types and so the separating critical quantity must increase,
too. As both i and i* increase (and also their di¤erence) (again ceteris paribus)
instead the critical size of bS diminishes.
As we did in the previous Section, we now need to check whether the dry type
interest costs in the buyback case are always lower than the ones it pays with no
buyback. The dry type might …nd it more advantageous to repurchase only a fraction
b < bS (again assuming that beliefs are such that Prob[W j b < bS = 1]) in order
to pay a lower buyback price in period zero and still be able to reduce her interest
costs in period one, after the asymmetry of information is cleared. Obviously, bS
will be preferable if the corresponding losses are lower, That is:
LD
£
W; b = b
¤
> LD
£
D; b ¸ bS¤
which means:
±
2
£
a+ GL + RD
b
¤2 > ±
2
[a+ GL + RWbS ]
2 (3.21)
that is:
±
2
·
a +GL + b
i
(1¡ s)
(1¡ pD)
(1 ¡ pW) + (1 ¡ b)i + F
(i*)2
(1¡ s)(1¡ pD
¸2
¡ ±
2
·
a +GL+ i + F
(i*)2
(1¡ pDb )
¸2
(3.22)
(3.22) as an equality is the equation of a parabola with two roots:
b1 =
F (i*)2(1 ¡ pD)(¡pD(1 ¡ pDb )¡ pDb + s)
(1¡ pDb )(pW ¡ pD)(1¡ s) ¡ s)i
and
b2 =
(1¡ pD)[F (i*)2(2 ¡ pD ¡ pDb + pDpDb ¡ s) + 2(a+ GL + i)(1 ¡ s)(1 ¡ pDb )]
(1¡ pDb )(pW ¡ pD(1¡ s) ¡ s)i
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which are both negative, assuming s > pWb + p
W ¡ pWpWb .8
Thus, for every positive b, the extra-losses from being believed dry are positive,
the dry type does not have any incentive to choose to appear wet and the separating
condition (3.18) is satis…ed.
In sum, if bS is the critical value for beliefs, then the separating equilibrium
works (assuming s > pWb + p
W ¡ pWpWb ; and indeed any value eb in between bS and
1 works (i.e. if beliefs are: P rob[dry] = 1 if b > bS and zero otherwise). But if eb
was above this range, then it is not a separating equilibrium as dry type would do
a lower buyback.
4. Empirical Evidence
A programme of repurchase in advance of maturity of outstanding securities (RAMS)
has actually included both bonds repurchase and bonds conversions. Either pro-
gramme may be carried out using various techniques. According to a questionnaire
(carried out by the Bank of Italy in November 1996), before 1990 RAMS opera-
tions were a rarity: only Sweden and the United Kingdom carried out them before
that year. From 1990 onwards, countries began to acquire experience in the use
of debt repurchases instruments and some of them have established regular bond
repurchasing programmes. Table 1, in the Appendix, reports the analytic answers
of 19 OECD countries (out of the 24 countries which have been interviewed by the
Bank of Italy).
Almost all countries which have introduced a RAMS programme have achieved
8b1 is positive either if s > pDb + p
D ¡ pDpDb and s < p
W¡pD
1¡pD or if s < p
D
b + p
D ¡ pDpDb and
_s > p
W¡pD
1¡pD ;while b2 is positive if s <
pW¡pD
1¡pD :
If s > pWb + p
W ¡ pW pWb (as above, p.21) then it follows that s > pDb + pD ¡ pDpDb and
s > p
W¡pD
1¡pD :Therefore b1 and b2 are both negative.
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their original aims. The percentage of debt that was repurchased in di¤erent coun-
tries ranges from 0.3% (for Italy) to signi…cant amounts (such as 12% performed
by Ireland).9 Among the most frequent objectives of the repurchase there are: the
reduction of the outstanding debt (which implies a reduction of the interest expen-
diture as well); a greater smoothing of the maturity pro…le (some countries used an
early redemption programme to eliminate heavy infra-year concentration of debt re-
demption; this permitted better management of cash ‡ow demand and reduced the
interest rate impact on the burden of the public debt); the reduction of debt servic-
ing costs (DSC) (after misalignements along the yield curve are identi…ed, securities
with yields not in line with the benchmark curve are repurchased) and elimination
of securities with poor liquidity (to maintain high liquidity in the secondary market,
some countries decided either to repurchase small amounts of illiquid bonds and
eliminated them or to switch from illiquid to liquid ones).
In the long run, all of these choices lead to a reduction of the cost of …nancing.
A market with a smoother redemption pro…le, more liquid instruments and an infor-
mative yield curve provide a government with lower cost and better opportunities
to fund its debt. Table 2, in the Appendix contains the analytic answers of the
interviewed countries.
Bonds repurchase and bonds conversions are the instruments that have been
mainly used (see Table 3, in the Appendix for more details). Debt exchange oper-
ations have been mostly used since they are self-…nancing: exchange o¤ers always
take place on the issue of new bonds. In fact, they are not meant to reduce the
stock of debt but to increase the market activity through an improvement of the
characteristics of liquidity and maturity of outstanding bonds. Buyback operations
9Actually, in order to make comparisons, also absolute values must be considered. In fact,
due to the di¤erent sizes of the outstanding debt, a percentage that appears trascurable might
correspond to a major operation in the pro…le of the debt.
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can be made either through a reverse auctions or in the secondary market. In coun-
tries with greater experience of this instrument, auctions usually take place on a
competitive basis where an advance announcement is given concerning the bonds to
be repurchased.10 In general, both debt exchange or reverse auction are held in a
more standardised procedure and, thus, they are less ‡exible instruments. For this
reason, several countries decided to choose a combination of the two.11
With the only exceptions of the Netherlands and New Zealand (where these
operations are open to all kind of investors), repurchase programmes usually take
place through intermediaries. Most of them are “market makers”, like primary
dealers or specialists in Government bonds (where they exist). In some other cases,
these operations take place through the Central Bank while the Treasury usually
coordinates them. Market information is given through professional channels in an
appropriate way. Every operator should be able to know about the opportunity that
the Treasury is giving the market.12
Finally, four kind of …nancial resources have been mainly used (as in Table 4,
in the Appendix). The majority of OECD countries use funds generated mainly by
the issue of new debt. Then there are the credit facilities with the central Bank (as
the access to funds of the Treasury, at the Central Bank, which are used to …nance
Government expenditure). Budget surplus are used as well and, …nally, there are
also special Fund (“Sinking Funds”) created, in Italy and in France for example,
10The bids submitted by operators are generally met with cut-o¤ prices determined either by
the Treasury or by the Central Bank. UK has a di¤erent procedure with a more active role of the
Central Bank.
11For example, in France, large operations were carried out with both reverse auction and debt
exchange o¤ers, while small adjustments were made through “standard repurchase”. In Italy a
composite set of instruments was used: reimbursement of bonds at maturity, buyback both with
reverse auction and on the secondary market.
12A few countries do not give any informations: Australia (where the operations are conducted
only by the Central Bank) and Iceland (where a press release is issued only after the operation is
closed).
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with the outcome of the privatisation.13
More recently, also in the United States (as in the Financial Times, August
1999 and March 2000), the Clinton administration has announced it has planned to
spend the forecast (over the next decade) budget surplus (worth around $3,000bn)
to buy-back 1,700 billions of dollars of public debt within the next 10 years (and to
eliminate it entirely by the 2015).14 Last January Larry Summers announced that
the government planned to buy-back up to $30 billion of the $5.7 trillion national
debt this year (of this total $3.6 trillion is held by the public) and last March the
Treasury Department actually paid $1.345 billion to repurchase $1 billion of the
national debt. Buybacks took the form of a reverse auction, in which the Treasury
selects o¤ers on a competitive basis based on the lowest prices and the buyback
was limited to 30-years bonds. It was the Treasury’s …rst debt repurchase in 70
years. In fact, the Treasury currently pays debt by replacing maturing debt with a
smaller amount of new debt, while the new proposal would allow it to repurchase
outstanding debt (particularly older, higher-yielding securities). Buybacks took the
form of a reverse auction, in which the Treasury selects o¤ers on a competitive basis
based on the lowest prices and the buyback was limited to 30-years bonds.
In sum, the main advantages of this plan would be: to use budget surpluses
to reduce the debt level and interest payments (rather than to …nance tax cuts); to
push more capital into private investments; to have more short-term, lower interest
rate debt and to make the benchmark 30-year Treasury bond more liquid. Following
news of the buyback plan, Treasury bonds prices have actually increased.
13While in France there are also other options, in Italy, a law (27/10/’93, No. 432) establishes
that all funds arising from privatisation must be used exclusively for the purpose of reducing public
debt.
14The Democrats have presented this plan as an alternative to the proposal of huge tax cuts,
over the next ten years, presented by the Republican. In fact, they claim that the gains due to
lowered interest costs (consequence of a smaller debt) will be equivalent to those of the announced
tax cut.
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4.1. The Data
The data we used were provided by the Banca d’Italia. They consist of 20 series of
bond prices for Italian medium/long-term bonds (i.e., “Buoni Poliennali del Tesoro”,
BTP and “Certi…cati del Tesoro a Tasso Variabile”, CCT) observed almost daily over
the period 3/10/1995 to 31/12/1997, for a total of 586 observations. Each series
is constructed considering approximately two months observations before and after
the repurchase date. We chose a quite short interval of time in order to be able to
investigate the impact of the buyback on the pattern of bonds’prices. Given the
relatively small amount of debt that is repurchased on average (approximately 10%
of the total outstanding amount of a every type of bond), if we considered a too
long period of time, the e¤ect of the buyback would be probably blurred.
Most of these repurchases were carried out during November and December
1995; October and December 1996 and November and December 1997. Overall
we obtained 22 series for the BTP bonds and 13 series for the CCT bond prices,
with an average of about 100 observations.15 One graph for each repurchase date is
presented in the Appendix. As we can see, in correspondence of the break point tB;
it is generally associated a small jump in prices, while after that, most of the series
decline.
Initially, we test the hypothesis of the presence of a structural break due to the
buyback, assuming that the break occurrs on the day of the repurchase, since we can
only know the day in which the repurchase occurrs, but not when it was announced
(if it was). Since most of our series are likely to be non-stationary we implemented
the testing procedure suggested by Perron (1989) which allows one simultaneously
to control for the presence of unit roots and break-points. Perron proposes three
15The total number of the series we considered is greater than the original one since some bond
has been repurchased more than once.
27
di¤erent variants of the traditional Dickey Fuller (1979) test, assuming that under
the alternative hypothesis the series is stationary around a segmented trend, rather
than a linear one. Under the alternative, the segmented trend can show a change in
the intercept (Model A), in the slope (Model B) or in both (Model C):
H0 : yt = a0 + yt¡1 + ¹2D(TB)t + "t (Model (A))
H1 : yt = a0 + a1yt¡1 + a2t+ ¹1DUt + "t
H0 : yt = a0 + yt¡1 +¹1DUt + "t (Model (B))
H1 : yt = a0+ a1yt¡1 + a2t+ ¹3DT*t + "t
H0 : yt = a0 + yt¡1+ ¹2D(TB)t +¹1DUt + "t (Model (C))
H1 : yt = a0 + a1yt¡1 + a2t+ ¹1DUt + ¹4DTt + "t
where tB is the break-point and:
DU = 1 if t > tB; 0 otherwise
D(TB) = 1 if t = tB +1; 0 otherwise
DT* = t¡ tB if t > tB; 0 otherwise
DT = t if t > tB; 0 otherwise
The three tests are carried out following the procedure in Perron, which requires
the regression of the dependent variable on a constant, a time trend, the lagged
dependent variable, DU and augmented di¤erences lag in order to remove autocor-
relation (according to Model A); on a constant, a time trend, the lagged dependent
variable, DT* and augmented lagged di¤erences (according to Model B); on a con-
stant, a time trend, the lagged dependent variable, DU , DT and augmented lagged
di¤erences (according to Model C).16
16For more details see Perron (1989), p. 1373 and Enders (1995), p. 247.
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We took logs of each series and estimated it under the three speci…cations and
the testing equation that performed best was Model C, which allows for both a
change in the intercept (DU) and for a change in the slope (DT) of the trend,
under alternative. In fact, analysing the pattern of the series, as in the graphs
in the Appendix, it seems appropriate to have a model that captures both a very
short-term break (associated to the date of the repurchase/breakpoint tB) and a
longer-term behaviour (after the repurchase the series generally decreases).
The detailed results are presented in Tables 5 and 6 and in Tables 5a and 6a
in the Appendix. Most of the series are non-stationary at 5% and 10% level of
signi…cance (see Table 5 and 6). The coe¢cient of DU is generally signi…cant and
positive, while the coe¢cient of DT is generally signi…cant and negative, which is
consistent with the behaviour observed in the graphs. For the series on BTP this
result holds in most cases (see Table 5). There are only few cases in which the
coe¢cients do not have the expected signs (as for I12675, I12678, I12686 and I36675
in Table 5) or they are not signi…cant (as for I12686, I12675, I36674 and I36675 in
Table 5a). For the series on CCT similar conclusions hold: in two cases coe¢cients
do not have the expected signs (I13097, I13204) and in other few cases they are not
signi…cant (I13097, I13204, I36612, I36690 and I36726).
However, invoking the null hypothesis for the series that are unambiguously
non stationary alters very much the results. Table 5a and 6a present the results
we obtain when the null is actually imposed (for both BTP and CCT) and they
look quite di¤erent respect those in Table 5 and 6 as the coe¢cient of DU is now
rarely signi…cant and the one of DP is almost never signi…cant. This big di¤erence
between the two sets of results actually questions the validity of the non-stationarity
test. The test seems to have low power, that is to be biased towards accepting the
null hypothesis. This can also be accentuated because of both the short span (two
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years) and the high frequency of the data (daily data incorporate lot of noise)17 .
Our interpretation of these results is that the initial impact of the repurchase
is to make the prices of the remaining bonds rise, since the coe¢cient of DU is
positive and signi…cant, as in Tables 5a and 6a. This result is actually consistent
with our theory as we can interpret an increase in bonds price (and correspondingly
a decrease in their rates of returns) as a signal that the buyback operation has
(somehow) positively a¤ected the credibility of a government. From the same Tables
it emerges that the coe¢cient of DT is negative in most cases, that is, after a short
period of time, the bonds’ prices generally decrease. Both results are consistent with
the behaviour observed in the graphs.
However, to explain the pattern of bonds’ prices as the period of time becomes
longer, we need a better model of all the factors that might a¤ect bonds’ prices,
not only taking into account their break-points. In this respect it could be very
useful to have access to the same kind of data for some other countries, since Italy
is generally considered as a “special case” as it su¤ers from political instability and
so from serious credibility problems. It would also be useful to increase the sample
to check the robustness of our results.
5. Conclusions
In this paper a model was developed in which public debt repurchases was a signal
of a government’s type. Asymmetry of information between the government and
private investors was assumed where a government could be of two types: a dry
type and a wet type, according to its willingness to implement a …scal stabilisation.
In particular interest rates were assumed to incorporate a risk premium which re-
17For this reason using the whole sample (rather than two months before and ahead the break)
does not make these results change at all.
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‡ected the expectation that the inability to implement a stabilisation programme
may have resulted in more in‡ation and/or taxation, or debt default. More specif-
ically, during a …scal stabilisation, private investors would lack con…dence in the
stabilisation programme and interest rates would be too high, re‡ecting this lack of
credibility. (This argument was somehow similar to an argument found in Missale
et al., 1997). Thus, a dry type which had to …nance new spending might want to
signal its resolution (type) in order to lower its interest costs and one way to do that
would be to repurchase a fraction of the outstanding debt. Actually, also the wet
type could decide to buyback some of its debt in order to pretend to be a dry type
and to (possibly) lower its interest payments. It was showed that a critical amount
of buyback exists such that the two types could be separated.
Finally, evidence is provided in favour of the hypothesis that the repurchase of
public debt is actually perceived as a good signal by private investors, consistently
with our theoretical model. In order to do that we analysed series of prices of
long term Italian bonds, in order to detect the presence of a structural break, in
correspondence to the day of the buyback. The data were provided by the Banca
d’Italia and they consisted of 20 series of bond prices for Italian medium/long-term
bonds (BTP and CCT) observed over the period 3/10/1995 to 31/12/1997, for a
total of 586 observations. Each series was constructed considering approximately
two months observations before and after the repurchase date. We implemented the
testing procedure suggested by Perron (1989) which allows to simultaneously control
for the presence of unit roots and break-points.
According to our results, the initial impact of the repurchase was to make the
prices of the remaining bonds rise, while, after a short period of time, these prices
generally decrease. This was consistent with our theory as we can interpret an
increase in bonds price (and correspondingly a decrease in their rates of returns)
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as a signal that the buyback operation has positively a¤ected the credibility of a
government. However, to explain the pattern of bonds’ prices as the period of time
increases, we should probably model better all the factors that might a¤ect bonds’
prices, not only taking into account their break-points. In this respect it could be
very useful to have access to the same kind of data for some other countries, since
Italy is generally considered as a “special case” as it su¤ers from political instability
and so from serious credibility problems.
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Appendix
Table 1: 19 OECD countries interviewed by the Bank of Italy
Countries Y/N Description
Australia Y Bond conversion. ’90-’91. RAMS since ’93
Austria Y No information
Belgium Y RAMS ’91-’92. Bond Conversion since ’91
Canada N
Denmark Y RAMS since ’90
Finland Y RAMS since ’94
France Y RAMS since ’91
Greece N Only some issues between ’91-’95 were repurchased
Iceland Y RAMS planned to start in 1997
Ireland Y RAMS since ’90
Italy Y RAMS since ’95
Netherlands Y RAMS only at the end ’94
New Zealand Y RAMS since ’90
Norway Y 2 RAMS. The …rst since ’95
Spain Y RAMS since ’95
Sweden Y RAMS since ’89
Switzerland N
United Kingdom Y RAMS since ’88
United States N
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Table 2: Reasons for the repurchase programme
Countries Description (*)
Australia (4) Poor liquidity (2) Smoothing
Austria (3) DSC (2) Smoothing (1) Debt reduction
Belgium (2) Smoothing (4) Poor liquidity (5) Old certi…cates
Denmark (2) Smoothing (6) FT (4) Poor liquidity (3) DSC
Finland (2) Smoothing (7) Short liquidity (5) Old certi…cates
France (2) Smoothing (4) Poor liquidity (3) DSC
Greece (1) Debt reduction (2) Smoothing (3) DSC (4)Poor liquidity
Iceland (2) Smoothing
Ireland (4) Poor liquidity (3) DSC (2) Smoothing
Italy (1) Debt reduction (2) Smoothing (4) Poor liquidity (3)DSC
Netherlands (4) Poor liquidity (8) Extend debt maturity (3) DSC
New Zealand (2) Smoothing (4) Poor liquidity
Norway (2) Smoothing (3) DSC (4) Poor liquidity
Spain (4) Poor liquidity (2) Smoothing
Sweden (4) Poor liquidity (2) Smoothing
United Kingdom (9) Money market management (2) Smoothing
(*) (1) Reduction of outstanding debt; (2) Smoothing of the maturity pro…le; (3)
Reduction of debt servicing costs (DSC); (4) Elimination of securities with poor liquidity;
(5) Elimination of old physical certi…cates; (6) Fine Tuning of the government borrowing
in accordance with the borrowing requirement (FT); (7) Elimination of securities with
short liquidity; (8) Extend the debt maturity; (9) Money market management.
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Table 3: Techniques adopted in the repurchase
Countries Description
Australia Buyback operations for stock nearing maturity (CB holding)
Austria Unannounced buyback operations
Belgium Bond Conversion (into longer maturity bonds)
Denmark Continuous buyback operations
Finland Debt exchange techniques
France OTC. Larger amounts: reverse auctions or public exchange
Greece Buyback of extraordinary issues (at interest payments)
Iceland Buyback operations and bond conversions
Ireland Switching programme and direct buybacks (rarely)
Italy Reverse auctions (illiquid assets) and buybacks
Netherlands Bond conversion and buyback operations
New Zealand Buyback and bond exchange (greater volume in a new bond)
Norway Buybacks (on the stock exchange), …xed-price o¤ers
Spain Debt exchange auctions and buybacks
Sweden Bond conversion
United Kingdom Purchases of “next maturities”, “small”/“index-linked” stocks (*)
Reverse auction and bond conversion
(*) “Next maturities”: Bank of England bids daily a price for bonds maturing within
the next three months; “small stocks”: Bank of England repurchases issue with extremely
low outstanding amount; “index-linked” stocks: sometimes the Bank of England is asked
by primary dealers to do so in order not to reduce the volume of such bonds in the market.
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Table 4: Source of …nancing used
Countries Description
Australia (2) credit facilities (1) new issues
Austria (3) budget surplus
Belgium (1) new issues
Denmark (1) new issues
Finland (1) new issues
France (1) new issues (4) special Fund
Greece
Iceland (1) new issues
Ireland (1) new issues
Italy (4) special Fund(a*)
Netherlands (1) new issues
New Zealand (1) new issues (initially short term)
Norway (1) new issues (2) credit facilities
Spain (2) credit facilities
Sweden (1) new issues
United Kingdom Since ’93 GOOA (Gilt Edged O¢cial Operations Account) )(b*)
(a*) In October 1993, the Italian government has instituted a Fund (with the out-
come of the privatisations) which could be used only to repurchase public debt. It could
constitute a “signal” of credibility both because it helps reducing internal debt and for an
“accounting” reason as well, since the outcome of the privatisations (a long term quantity)
is imputed to reduce debt (a stock quantity) and not current expenditure.
(b*) It is an account through which all o¢cial transactions in Gilts passe (sales and
purchase). It is managed by the National Debt Commissioners under the authority of the
Treasury.
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Table 5: Results of the structural break test
BTP Buyback date Model (C): ¸
yt¡1 const. trend DU DT lags
I2675b 31/10/1996 -0.121 0.565 2.39E-05 0.004 -5.29E-05 0 NS .532
(B1) (-2.957) (2.956) (2.854) (3.479) (-3.698)
I36606 31/10/1996 -0.148 0.683 -2.61E-06 0.002 -2.88E-05 0 NS .532
(C1) (-3.402) (3.402) (-1.0001) (3.426) (-3.727)
I36622 31/10/1996 -0.122 0.568 2.15E-05 0.004 -4.86E-05 0 NS .532
(D1) (-3.119) (3.118) (3.261) (3.547) (-3.884)
I36631 31/10/1996 -0.101 0.468 2.41E-05 0.003 -4.48E-05 0 NS .532
(E1) (-2.744) (2.744) (2.968) (3.300) (-3.608)
I36635 31/10/1996 -0.125 0.581 3.96E-05 0.004 -6.08E-05 1 NS .532
(F1) (-3.066) (3.065) (3.464) (3.613) (-3.983)
I36641 31/10/1996 -0.113 0.527 3.66E-05 0.004 -5.84E-05 0 NS .532
(G1) (-3.010) (3.010) (3.135) (3.737) (-3.934)
I36650 31/10/1996 -0.093 0.429 4.00E-05 0.004 -5.41E-05 0 NS .532
(H1) (-2.673) (2.673) (3.016) (3.334) (-3.669)
I36676 31/10/1996 -0.108 0.494 0.0001 0.010 -0.0001 0 NS .532
(I1) (-2.974) (2.977) (2.922) (3.055) (-2.891)
I36682 31/10/1996 -0.172 0.793 1.60E-05 0.002 -2.65E-05 4 S .532
(J1) (-4.196)** (4.195) (4.424) (4.298) (-4.642)
I36691 31/10/1996 -0.181 0.832 2.84E-05 0.003 -4.02E-05 4 S .532
(K1) (-4.499)* (4.498) (5.051) (4.963) (-5.346)
I36707 31/10/1996 -0.180 0.275 9.63E-06 0.001 -1.44E-05 4 S .532
(L1) (-4.552)* (4.551) (5.070) (5.141) (-5.479)
I36715 31/10/1996 -0.182 0.842 6.12E-05 0.006 -8.28E-05 4 S .532
(M1) (-4.216)** (4.215) (4.672) (4.798) (-5.116)
I36727 31/10/1996 -0.121 0.564 4.47E-05 0.005 -6.06E-05 0 NS .532
(N1) (-3.025) (3.025) (3.242) (3.486) (-3.761)
I36740 31/10/1996 -0.110 0.512 5.07E-05 0.005 -6.61E-05 0 NS .532
(O1) (-2.883) (2.883) (3.133) (3.452) (-3.732)
I36747 31/10/1996 -0.121 0.562 6.65E-05 0.006 -7.57E-05 0 NS .532
(P1) (-2.996) (2.997) (3.207) (3.456) (-3.709)
t statistics are reported in parenthesis. NS refers to the non stationarity of the series.
¸ is the proportion of observations occurring before the structural change.
The critical value for Model C and for ¸=0.05 is -4.24 at 5% (*)
and -3.96 at 10% (**).
The asympotic distribution of the other coe¢cients’ t statistic is standardized
normal. Data are expressed in logs.
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Table 5 contd.: Results of the structural break test
BTP Buyback date Model (C): ¸
yt¡1 const. trend DU DT lags
I12686 31/10/1996 -0.099 0.457 -1.16E-05 0.0001 -4.51E-06 1 NS .568
(B1) (-1.605) (1.605) (-1.673) (0.788) (-1.321)
I36674 31/10/1996 -0.136 0.627 1.24E-07 0.0001 -3.62E-06 1 NS .568
(C1) (-2.416) (2.416) (0.058) (0.890) (-1.305)
I12675 30/11/1995 -0.160 0.739 3.25E-05 -0.002 4.36E-05 0 NS .524
(B1) (-2.548) (2.547) (1.484) (-0.846) (1.020)
I12678 30/11/1995 -0.249 1.152 2.69E-05 -0.005 0.0001 0 NS .524
(C1) (-3.318) (3.318) (1.858) (-2.694) (2.817)
I12686 30/11/1995 -0.260 1.199 2.33E-05 -0.002 4.39E-05 2 S .524
(D1) (-4.250)* (4.249) (2.134) (-2.548) (2.333)
I36675 3/11/1997 -0.145 0.671 -1.09E-05 -0.001 2.54E-05 2 NS .565
(B1) (-2.440) (2.442) (-1.114) (-1.356) (1.600)
I36607 12/12/1995 -0.133 0.614 5.86E-05 0.007 -6.76E-05 1 NS .553
(B1) (-3.074) (3.074) (2.030) (2.294) (-1.675)
t statistics are reported in parenthesis. NS refers to the non stationarity of the series.
¸ is the proportion of observations occurring before the structural change.
The critical value for Model C and for both ¸=0.06 and ¸=0.05 is -4.24 at 5% (*).
For ¸=0.06 it is -3.95 and for ¸=0.05 it is -3.96, at 10% level of signi…cance (**).
The asympotic distribution of the other coe¢cients’ t statistic is standardized
normal.
Data are expressed in logs.
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Table 6: Results of the structural break test
CCT Repurchase date Model (C): ¸
yt¡1 const. trend DU DT lags
I13096 31/10/96 -0.230 1.060 -8.74E-06 0.0004 -5.49E-06 1 S .371
(B1) (-4.311)* (4.311) (-0.898) (2.010) (-0.653)
I13097 31/10/96 -0.042 0.196 2.93E-06 -0.0003 5.18E-06 1 NS .371
(C1) (-0.771) (0.771) (0.241) (-1.378) (0.461)
I13204 31/10/96 -0.037 0.173 1.08E-05 -0.0001 -5.16E-06 2 NS .371
(D1) (-0.573) (0.572) (1.006) (-0.543) (-0.510)
I36612 31/10/96 -0.140 0.647 -1.14E-06 0.0003 -5.61E-06 1 NS .371
(E1) (-2.010) (2.010) (-0.081) (0.997) (-0.461)
I36690 31/10/96 -0.062 0.285 1.33E-05 0.0002 -1.42E-05 0 NS .371
(F1) (-1.084) (1.084) (0.911) (0.414) (-0.972)
I36685 3/11/97 -0.109 0.502 4.95E-06 0.0005 -6.86E-06 1 NS .528
(B1) (-2.608) (2.608) (1.654) (1.974) (-1.953)
I36690 3/11/97 -0.0006 0.060 3.39E-06 0.0005 -6.31E-06 0 NS .528
(C1) (-1.576) (1.576) (1.290) (1.837) (-1.885)
I36694 3/11/97 -0.110 0.506 5.61E-06 0.0006 -7.39E-06 1 NS .528
(D1) (-2.704) (2.705) (1.833) (2.084) (-2.057)
I13207 31/12/96 -0.001 0.138 -8.19E-07 0.002 -2.71E-05 1 NS .5
(B1) (-2.909) (2.908) (-0.280) (2.336) (-2.751)
I36611 31/12/96 -0.160 0.742 3.27E-07 0.002 -2.87E-05 1 NS .5
(C1) (-3.857) (3.857) (0.103) (3.282) (-3.395)
I36629 31/12/96 -0.150 0.739 .1.51E-07 0.002 -3.18E-05 0 NS .5
(D1) (-3.392) (3.392) (0.043) (2.890) (-3.006)
I36726 19/12/1997 -0.221 1.018 1.07E-05 0.0008 -1.53E-05 2 NS .695
(B1) (-2.575) (2.575) (2.555) (1.085) (-1.366)
I36746 19/12/1997 -0.271 1.253 1.21E-05 0.001 -2.11E-05 1 NS .695
(C1) (-3.444) (3.444) (3.011) (1.645) (-1.900)
t statistics are reported in parenthesis. NS refers to the non stationarity of the series.
¸ is the proportion of observations occurring before the structural change.
The critical value for Model C and for ¸=0.07 is –4.18 at 5% (*)
and -3.86 at 10% (**).
For ¸=0.05, it is -4.24 at 5% (*) and –3.96 at 10% (**).
For ¸=0.04, it is -4.22 at 5% (*) and -3.95 at 10% (**).
The asympotic distribution of the other coe¢cients’ t statistic is standardized
normal.
Data are expressed in logs.
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Table 5a: Results of the structural break test (under H0)
BTP Buyback date Model (C): % Euro
const. DU DP lags (mill.)
I2675b 31/10/1996 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 0 41
(B1) (0.949) (-1.446) (0.142)
I36606 31/10/1996 -4.17E-05 -0.0001 0.0003 0 10
(C1) (-0.960) (-2.191) (0.785)
I36622 31/10/1996 8.69E-05 -0.0002 0.0004 0 31
(D1) (0.983) (-1.835) (0.602)
I36631 31/10/1996 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0009 0 41
(E1) (1.725) (-2.060) (1.210)
I36635 31/10/1996 0.0002 -0.0003 0.001 1 2
(F1) (1.925) (-1.847) (1.437)
I36641 31/10/1996 0.0002 -0.0003 0.002 0 46
(G1) (1.931) (-1.849) (2.613)
I36650 31/10/1996 0.0002 -0.0002 0.002 4 16
(H1) (1.436) (-1.303) (2.081)
I36676 31/10/1996 0.001 -0.0002 0.006 0 .5% 13
(I1) (2.275) (-0.415) (1.877)
I36682 31/10/1996 9% 67
(J1)
I36691 31/10/1996 10% 77
(K1)
I36707 31/10/1996 57
(L1)
I36715 31/10/1996 62
(M1)
I36727 31/10/1996 0.0002 -0.0003 0.001 0 10% 88
(N1) (2.047) (-1.604) (1.230)
I36740 31/10/1996 0.0002 -0.0003 0.002 4 2.7% 28
(O1) (1.560) (-1.282) (1.653)
I36747 31/10/1996 0.0004 -0.0004 0.002 0 1.1% 15
(P1) (2.548) (-1.533) (1.297)
The asympotic distribution of the coe¢cients’ t statistic is standardized normal.
t statistics are reported in parenthesis.
The last two columns contain the amount of debt repurchased (in million euro):
the percentage (%) and the total amount respectively.
Data are expressed in logs.
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Table 5a contd.: Results of the structural break test (under H0)
BTP Buyback date Model (C): Euro
const. DU DP lags (mill.)
I12686 31/10/1996 -0.0001 -0.0001 7.50E-05 1 26
(B1) (-3.951) (-2.603) (0.413)
I36674 31/10/1996 3.06E-05 -6.25E-05 -3.93E-05 1 21
(C1) (1.222) (-1.659) (-0.236)
I12675 30/11/1995 4.63E-05 0.0003 0.0006 0 277
(B1) (0.174) (0.859) (0.340)
I12678 30/11/1995 9.47E-05 0.0004 -0.0005 0 204
(C1) (0.544) (1.614) (-0.440)
I12686 30/11/1995 1077
(D1)
I36675 3/11/1997 8.04E-05 -3.78E-06 -0.0003 2 1067
(B1) (0.638) (-0.020) (-0.384)
I36607 12/12/1995 0.0003 -4.07E-05 0.001 1 191
(B1) (0.793) (-0.068) (0.324)
The asympotic distribution of the coe¢cients’ t statistic is standardized normal.
t statistics are reported in parenthesis.
The last column contains the total amount of debt repurchased (in million euro).
Data are expressed in logs.
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Table 6a: Results of the structural break test (under H0)
CCT Repurchase date Model (C): % Euro
const. DU DP lags (mill.)
I13096 31/10/96 .28% 10
(B1)
I13097 31/10/96 2.31E-05 -1.58E-05 3.21E-05 1 .4% 10
(C1) (0.266) (-0.148) (0.081)
I13204 31/10/96 -8.21E-06 1.51E-05 -3.43E-05 2 .18% 5
(D1) (-0.110) (0.166) (-0.104)
I36612 31/10/96 2.16E-06 -4.86E-07 -2.36E-05 1 4% 31
(E1) (0.023) (-0.004) (-0.055)
I36690 31/10/96 0.0002 -0.0002 1.87E-20 0 3.5% 36
(F1) (2.162) (-1.743) (4.01E-17)
I36685 3/11/97 4.58E-05 -6.08E-05 9.44E-05 1 98% 759
(B1) (1.227) (-1.125) (0.319)
I36690 3/11/97 4.04E-05 -6.23E-05 3.76E-05 1 13.2% 418
(C1) (1.031) (-1.096) (0.121)
I36694 3/11/97 4.81E-05 -5.92E-05 8.96E-05 1 51% 1164
(D1) (1.268) (-1.077) (0.297)
I13207 31/12/96 1.13E-05 -0.0002 -0.0008 0
(B1) (0.236) (-2.957) (-2.117)
I36611 31/12/96 7.55E-06 -0.0001 0.0001 2 10% 155
(C1) (0.133) (-1.675) (0.358)
I36629 31/12/96 3.38E-05 -0.0002 0.0002 0 13.2% 170
(D1) (0.538) (-2.311) (0.347)
I36726 19/12/1997 4.94E-05 -7.73E-05 7.27E-05 2 40% 413
(B1) (1.256) (-1.095) (0.250)
I36746 19/12/1997 5.46E-05 -8.96E-05 -5.14E-05 2 26% 1033
(C1) (1.385) (-1.265) (-0.178)
The asympotic distribution of the coe¢cients’ t statistic is standardized normal.
t statistics are reported in parenthesis.
The last two columns contain the amount of debt repurchased (in million euro):
the percentage (%) and the total amount respectively.
Data are expressed in logs.
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Figure 5.1: BTP, OCT (tB = 67)
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Figure 5.2: BTP, OCT bis (tB = 46)
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Figure 5.3: BTP, NOV (tB = 43)
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Figure 5.4: BTP, NOV bis (tB = 48)
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Figure 5.5: BTP, DEC (tB = 57)
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Figure 5.6: CCT, OCT (tB = 23)
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Figure 5.7: CCT, NOV (tB = 65)
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Figure 5.8: CCT, DEC (tB = 62)
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Figure 5.9: CCT, DEC bis (tB = 57)
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